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Why criminology must break its chains 
 
The non-conservative dimension of criminology is currently dominated by what we can 
describe loosely as the ‘liberal left’, the conglomeration of liberal humanism, ‘new left’ 
culturalism, identity politics and anarchism that grew in the 1960s as a multifaceted protest 
against the ‘old orders’ of conservatism, corporate capitalism, patriarchy, racism and failed 
state socialism. In the post-war era liberal-left criminology has been evasive whenever it 
encounters the discipline’s primary aetiological question: ‘why individuals or corporate 
bodies are willing to risk the infliction of harm on others in order to further their own 
instrumental or expressive interests’ (Hall, 2012a: 1). Conservative and classical liberal 
criminologists are less evasive, but their metatheory rests on the ancient and reductive 
ontological certainty of the human being as the intrinsically ‘fallen’ creature, which ignores 
Fredric Jameson’s (1981) reminder that we should always historicise – by which he means 
periodise – the human condition and our attempts to understand it. On the other side of the 
divide, today’s liberal left celebrates the possibility of radical indeterminacy, the notion that, 
should actors dissent and choose to act differently, things could always be different: by which 
they really mean ‘better’, even though they are normally shy of expressing such moral 
essentialism.  
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However, as it slowly dawns on the discipline’s liberal-left wing that its core metatheoretical 
assumption of crime as misguided proto-political dissent expressed by the victimised actor 
has been a fatal category error (Hall et al., 2008; Treadwell et al., 2013), it’s too easy for 
conservative critics to say, with some justification, that liberal-left criminology cannot 
recognise or explain its own principal objects of harm and crime, or explain why people do 
such things to each other. This is one reason why Western populations are currently 
abandoning any faith they might still have in liberal-left politics to ‘deliver them from evil’ 
(see Becker, 1975), or, in plain secular parlance, prevent the harms caused by the sporadic 
and systemic crime, violence and corruption that can be found throughout the social structure.  
 
This evasion creates a vacuum into which right-wing contenders flow to offer populist 
explanations and punitive solutions. When Western crime rates increased in the 1960s and 
1970s despite increases in freedom and affluence and the (albeit temporary) truncation of 
social inequality, doubt was cast on the liberal left’s rather tentative causal explanations of 
relative deprivation and repression. Subsequently criminology entered its first ‘aetiological 
crisis’ (Young, 1987). However, the liberal left, hamstrung by its proclivity to sneer at 
aetiology and marginalise theory in its educational and research programmes, preferring 
instead to strut its pluralist, deconstructive sophistication and put most of its effort into a 
long-running critique of punitive social reaction, still seems reluctant to accept the 
requirement for new ideas relevant to today’s circumstances.  
 
The liberal left is now a firmly established paradigm and resistant to new ideas. A clear 
example of such resistance can be detected in the philosophical kernel of the critical industry 
that grew around the global popularity of Slovene radical philosopher Slavoj Žižek, who 
provides us with new conceptions of ideology and subjectivity that are relevant to 
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criminology (Winlow and Hall, 2013; Hall, 2012a). Later in this article I will present a brief 
synopsis of the position of transcendental materialism, based on the work of Žižek and 
others, which, if combined with some emergent in-house concepts, could present criminology 
with a new perspective. This position provides new ways of thinking about ideology and 
subjectivity, based on a fundamental traumatic encounter with the Real and the individual’s 
solicitation of a coherent symbolic order driven by a pressing need for comprehensibility and 
coherence (Johnston, 2008; Hall, 2012b).  
 
However, criminology is an importer discipline (Loader and Sparks, 2010), therefore it must 
wait for new ideas to filter through the more established disciplines of philosophy, social 
sciences and the humanities. Whereas the conservative and classical liberal wing of the 
intellectual establishment has continued to act as expected, ignoring all new ideas and 
continuing to research the most effective ways of bolstering traditional institutions, the 
liberal-left wing’s reaction to Žižek’s ideas has been more interesting. It is founded on a 
concern that the ontological and ethical foundation of his particular form of cultural politics – 
drawn chiefly from Hegel, Marx and Lacan – discerns essential value in some traditional 
institutions, such as family, universalist philosophy, executive political power, the state, 
religion and socialism. For many on the liberal left, seeing any value in these slain dragons 
would return us to some variant of the old oppressive order and its normative structures such 
as statism, heteronormativity or patriarchy (see Braidotti, 2002). Žižek’s Hegelian-Lacanian 
conception of subjectivity has elicited the utmost concern from the liberal left; the claim that 
the subject is born in a trauma that makes its unbounded freedom an impossible burden. For 
Judith Butler, his concept of the originary trauma presupposes that kinship and sociality share 
a traditional structure: 
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What he's doing is consolidating these binaries as absolutely necessary. He's 
rendering a whole domain of social life that does not fully conform to prevalent 
gender norms as psychotic and unliveable (1993: 37) 
 
Butler suspects that such a theory of primal trauma is the road back to conservative 
oppression because it insists that subjectivity must be grounded in traditional kinship and 
social relations that, for her, are saturated with heteronormative assumptions. She was not the 
first to join the great collective knee-jerk. Dews (1995) accused him of denying the creative 
processes of reflexivity and intersubjectivity, although his position changed markedly in later 
work (Dews, 2008) of more interest to criminology. Holloway (2002) accused him of 
reviving a notion of totalizing executive political power that we must consign to the dustbin 
of history because of the death and destruction it caused in the past. Ebert (1999) accused him 
of masking his actual cynicism with his analysis of cynicism, which throws the damp cloth of 
‘metacynism’ over today’s active and incrementally successful reformist identity politics. He 
has also been accused of a multitude of other sins (see Parker, 2004 for a discussion).  
 
Underlying this conception of subjectivity as trauma is the universalist philosophy that Žižek 
advocates. For the liberal left, such universalism would halt the march of piecemeal progress 
and return politics to an unwinnable ideological battle. Left liberals fear the return of the 
‘Law’, the Oedipal relation that the child-as-subject must negotiate to enter civilization, the 
symbolic order that must enter the subject’s unconscious if it is to recruit drives and desires to 
its transcendental ideals and ensure its essential maintenance and reproduction. For Žižek, 
however, this does not mean the return of traditional elite authority, its ontological certainty 
and its repressive system of control and punishment, but it does mean the return of symbolic 
reconstruction as the ultimate end of initial deconstruction and dissent. It is dawning on some 
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other thinkers that symbolic reconstruction and the return of the collective super-ego might 
be the essential prerequisites for the eventual downsizing of the repressive control system 
(Stiegler, 2009; Crogan, 2010). 
 
Criticism of the symbolic reconstruction and unifying politics advocated by Žižek and other 
contemporary European thinkers has cooled off since the financial crisis in 2008 and the 
failure of the ensuing worldwide protests to coalesce into a political movement offering a 
genuine alternative. For some, as neoliberalism ploughs its destructive furrow with renewed 
conviction in the immediate wake of one of its most catastrophic failures (see Mirowski, 
2013), as recession, socioeconomic austerity, relentless exploitation of cheap, expendable 
labour and the upward flood of wealth towards the neoliberal elite create precarious lives and 
increase fear and insecurity, yet no coherent oppositional politics can get off the ground, 
Žižek’s cynicism is begrudgingly accepted (see Winlow and Hall 2013). Others, liberals and 
conservatives alike, conform to tradition and accentuate the positive – progress made in 
human rights and personal freedom, technological developments and so on. Criminology is 
stuck in a rather odd position across this divide between pessimism and optimism. The much-
vaunted statistical crime decline in the West since the mid-1990s has nudged the discipline 
over onto the optimistic side almost by default. Conservatives and classical liberals are 
obviously celebrating the statistical decline as evidence that capitalism and its attendant 
institutions are back on track. However, whilst the liberal left remain circumspect and 
divided, established liberals such as Pinker (2012) also celebrate of the statistical decline 
because they suspect it must be a result of a new fairness, sociability and gentleness as the 
people’s rainbow alliance of piecemeal cultural struggles against the system’s traditional 
iniquity bears fruit.  
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The recent statistical crime decline, although now coming under increasing critical scrutiny 
(see Parker, 2008), has reinforced the notion that new ideas are not really required at the 
moment. Criminology’s aetiological negligence is the result of both too much optimism from 
the liberal left, for which the crime decline is real and a gift from good people, and too much 
pessimism from the neoliberal right, for which it is a gift from the good state working 
effectively against bad people. The result is that the excellent criminological research 
currently in train is being starved of new ideas in its two primary dimensions: firstly, new 
trends in harm and innovative criminality, and secondly, philosophy and theory, where 
conceptual tools needed to investigate the political, economic and psycho-cultural contexts 
underneath these trends can be created. For instance – just to refer to a small few selected 
from a large body – penetrative new ideas such as the ‘depressive hedonia’ and ‘soft 
narcosis’ (see Fisher, 2009) pervading youth culture and driving young people into social and 
political withdrawal, all-purpose scavenging and soft criminality, ‘post-politics’ (Mouffe, 
2000), the ‘crime-consumer couplet’ (see Passavant, 2005), the new ‘super-ego injunction to 
enjoy’ (see Žižek, 2008) and the ‘libidinal economy’ (see Stiegler, 2011), which depoliticise 
and desubjectivise young people, have been ignored by most criminologists.  
 
Systematically ignoring this large body of new ideas and chaining ourselves to politico-
philosophical concepts from the dawn of the ‘new left’ in the 1960s – such as ‘moral 
economy’, ‘moral panic’, ‘imaginary solutions’ and so on – allows criminologists to keep on 
conjuring up increasingly far-fetched notions drawn from the principle that crimes are 
misguided proto-political actions (see Taylor et al., 1973). Thus we get the unlikely claim 
that the English consumer riots of 2011 were ‘preconsciously’ political (Akram, 2014) 
because political urges are stored in the habitus of today’s young people; we don’t see them 
articulated or practiced, but they’re there all the same. Akram, however, entirely 
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misunderstands Bourdieu, for whom habitus is an internalised guide to the dominant external 
logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1990), and as such the most difficult aspect of the human psyche 
for reflexive thought to penetrate, not an internal source of oppositional pre-political impulses 
to be stirred into action at the first sight of unfairness (Hall, 2012a). This convenient 
misunderstanding allowed Akram to fabricate this concept even as politics palpably failed to 
reassert itself in the midst of the most serious global economic crisis since 1929 and its 
destructive social fallout, and even as the absorption of potentially political young people into 
the depoliticising surrogate social order of consumer culture was painfully obvious 
(Treadwell et al., 2013; Winlow and Hall, 2012). The liberal left had no answer to why these 
young people chose to do harm to each other and their environment rather than engage in 
articulate politics, which again allowed the right to press their case for individual ‘evil’ 
disconnected from its underlying economic, social and cultural contexts. 
 
 
Harm and the politics of aetiological revival 
 
There is no consensual understanding of harm in criminology, but in a post-war era 
characterised by the increasing dominance of interpretivism and relativism the ambition that 
this can be arrived at was somewhat marginalised. Criminology must return this debate to the 
centre of criminological education and research. The first step is to decentre legal definitions 
of crime and centralise a serious debate on harm. This will not be easy. The political 
philosophy behind each criminological faction prefers to depict the identity-group it 
represents as the innocent and oppressed victim. The two big players have the loudest voices; 
conservatives will resist definitions of business activity as harmful, whilst left liberals will 
resist definitions of drug taking or petty property crime as harmful. Libertarians will argue 
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that our entitlement to define anything as harmful should be pruned as vigorously as possible. 
Relativists and constructivists acknowledge the existence of a core of consensual harms, but 
they tend to reduce this category to ‘brutal violence’ (see Henry and Milovanovic, 1996). 
This definition is both too nebulous and too restrictive, the product of a resolute reluctance to 
open up a debate at the centre of the discipline. Such reluctance is the product of left 
liberalism’s all-encompassing fear of what to them is the only real perpetrator of harm, the 
oppressive state bearing down on free individuals on behalf of the traditional normative 
order, and the concern that any expansion of the category of consensual harm, or indeed any 
prominent debate on the issue, will justify the equivalent expansion of modes of 
‘governmentality’ (see for instance Ericson, 2006).  
 
However, perhaps a better first principle is that irrational fear from any political or cultural 
position should not rule criminological thought – everyday people’s fear of overwhelming 
criminality, conservatives’ fear of the ‘working class mob’, liberals’ fear of the state and 
normative orders, or whatever – and it is wrong to attempt to close down the debate; wrong 
for the integrity of the criminological discipline and wrong for future generations who might 
want the opportunity to make their own decisions in the specific historical circumstances in 
which they find themselves. Harm cannot be limited to brutal acts of physical violence 
because it is an expansive and variegated category that contains an assortment of acts and 
experiential consequences. We will investigate this issue later as we encounter the concept of 
the pseudo-pacification process and consider the possibility that the culturally expansive and 
economically functional sublimation of harm from its raw form of brutal violence should be 
criminology’s central concern.  
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Behind this intellectual evasion is the powerful post-war current of political catastrophism. 
We still live in the shadow of Stalinism and Nazism, the abhorrent products of Schmitt’s 
(1985; see also Agamben, 2005) ‘state of exception’, the self-conferred entitlement to 
suspend human rights in order to purify the social body and establish authoritarian political 
regimes. Agamben’s homo sacer is the subject of the state of exception, an expendable 
individual victim who is neither murdered nor sacrificed, but cast outside of all legal and 
normative categories to be killed with impunity. This historical abyss disturbed the liberal-
left sensibility to such an extent that it attempted to dismantle collective politics outright in 
order to eliminate all risk of the return of institutionalised genocide (Jacoby, 2005). To a 
large extent it succeeded in its mission, thus we now exist in an unprecedented era of post-
politics, a self-induced political paralysis. Unfortunately, however, the continuation of war 
and genocide across the world and current signs of the return of the far right in the 
industrialised West suggest that this tactic did not achieve its goal (Hall, 2012c; Winlow and 
Hall, 2013).  
 
Political catastrophism was over-extended (Žižek, 2001). A large number of recent social 
scientific texts begin with grim warnings against totalitarianism followed by a brief 
genuflection to Foucault on ‘biopower’ and ‘governmentality’, then they proceed to place 
things like government healthcare warnings in the same category as gang violence, as 
discursive objects constructed to raise public concern, whip up ‘moral panics’ and increase 
state power over the individual (see for instance, Matthews 2014). However, this over-
extended reaction also destroyed the credibility of the social-democratic regulatory 
framework, which allowed the libertarian anarcho-capitalist right to return to the centre of 
politics and culture (Harvey, 2007). Once established there they completed with ease the 
destructive task of crushing conservatism, communism, socialism and social democracy alike 
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to unleash the forces of the neoliberal market upon us all. Now we find ourselves in a world 
of totalitarian neoliberalism, administered by a corporate oligarchy and plagued by widening 
social inequality, jobless financial growth, the economic marginalisation of youth, 
proliferating urban slums, ethnic and geopolitical tensions and the normalisation of global 
criminal markets. We also face the return of reactionary protectionism and an upsurge of 
resolute nationalism, ethnocentrism and racism.  
 
In short, the traditional socialist left quit whilst the liberal left survived by acting as the 
reluctant under-labourer to the neoliberal right (Dean, 2009). Now, as the tenured job fades 
from view and the social welfare comes under concerted attack, the sole immediate solution 
to harm and crime is the security state, precisely what liberals wanted to avoid. In the absence 
of a feasible political alternative, harm, crime and their complex probabilistic aetiology are 
downplayed and customised to fit the only solutions on offer; from the liberal left a 
downsized and humanized criminal justice system embedded in a comprehensive welfare 
system, and from the neoliberal right a more efficient criminal justice system embedded in a 
downsized welfare system and a wealth-creating deregulated capitalist economy. This means, 
of course, that the ‘problem’ is being defined by the approved solutions, which both rest on 
the fundamental fallacy that harm and crime are indeed aberrant problems rather than, as we 
shall see later, the consequences of practicing normality in a specific way. The displacement 
of honest and penetrative criminological debate on aetiology is diverting attention from the 
reality that political intervention in the socioeconomic field of a far more fundamental type is 
required if the criminogenic conditions of late capitalism are to be addressed (Currie, 2010).  
 
The culturo-political fragmentation of the left and the dominance of hard-line social 
constructionism and relativism in its intellectual discourse have together led us into the 
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impenetrable fog of symbolic inefficiency, which has infused not only criminology and social 
science but also politics and popular culture (Winlow and Hall, 2013). Pulled along in the 
wake of Derrida and the cult of deconstruction, we find ourselves no longer able to establish 
meaning except for the short time required to deconstruct and destroy it. Embracing anti-
statism, dissidence and subversion with no political purpose, the liberal left has permanently 
suspended any chance that real interventionist politics might return. Social movements come 
and go with little lasting effect apart from the entry of various cultural identity-groups into 
the system’s interpersonal competition, whilst the precariat grows, criminal activity mutates 
and the security state expands in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of substantial 
democratic forms of political intervention.  
 
 
Subjectivity and special liberty 
 
Whilst liberal-left criminology pumps away with its traditional critique of state and corporate 
harms, it ignores the vitally important cultural currents, individuals and forms of subjectivity 
behind these harms. We might want to consider the concept of special liberty (Hall, 2012a). 
This cultural norm operates as a form of subjective permission to allow business operators to 
inflict multiple harms of varying magnitude on human beings and their environments, 
justifying their actions, and therefore defining themselves, as essential to the continuation of 
progress and prosperity. However, this normative mentality is not entirely restricted to a 
structural elite class; special liberty is a general cultural current. Since deindustrialisation, 
legitimate and illegitimate markets have expanded to attract numerous individuals, thus the 
permission and the inclination to risk inflicting harm on others – to simply ‘get things done’ 
in order that the competitive logic of business can be served – operates throughout the social 
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structure, from corporate boardrooms to ghettoes. To the subject of special liberty, who 
regards himself as a miniaturized sovereign state, the everyday individual is a sublimated 
variant of homo sacer, a worthless unit not necessarily to be killed – although in extreme 
cases this does happen – but to be exploited with impunity in order to serve the logic of the 
market and the enrichment of the Master. 
 
Harms are not restricted to the material dimension expressed in the standard culturo-legal 
terms ‘person and property’. They can also be found in the environmental, 
financial/economic, social, cultural, emotional and psychological realms. To make 
intellectual and political progress in the midst of such diversity, and to offer philosophical aid 
to sub-disciplines such as green criminology and feminist criminology, which are attempting 
to address specific dimensions of harm, we could revisit the Hegelian notion of social 
recognition as a first step in an attempt to ground and unify harm as a working category (Yar, 
2012). The ethical demand that all those who act in the world should recognise the rights and 
empathise with the fundamental needs and emotional sensibilities of others is the foundation 
of this position. Although needs are multi-dimensional, for Honneth (1996) they can be 
reduced to the categories of material survival, love, rights and esteem.  
 
However, first we must overcome a considerable obstacle thrown up by the reality of life in 
late capitalism. We can no longer use Hegel’s formulation in its original form because in late 
capitalism’s socioeconomic order the social interdependency on which social recognition 
between the Master and Slave depends has been severed. As automated production and 
deregulated finance dominate the global economy, and the return on capital now exceeds the 
rate of growth in the real economy expressed in output and wages (Piketty, 2014), the global 
oligarchy can simply dispense with the services of an increasing number of people and leave 
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them to their own devices. Most of the Slaves, even those who hold on to precarious service 
work, are technically redundant, therefore the Master’s recognition of the Slave and his need 
for the Slave’s work, approval and consent are no longer compulsory. The organic relational 
and reciprocal source of the Slave’s political power has receded into the past. The Master is 
now entitled to special liberty by default, which in turn enables and justifies narcissistic self-
affirmation and the reduction of social recognition to an arbitrary choice.  
 
As organic socioeconomic interdependency unravels, the security state expands to enforce 
pacification, and seductive mass media and consumer culture recruit the subject to their 
fantasised surrogate social world, the Master finds himself under little pressure to respond to 
dwindling judgements and protests about multiple harms. The Slave, deprived of organic 
relational interdependency and class solidarity, finds that mimicry of the Master’s business 
practices in brutal subterranean environments is one of the most reliable ways to guarantee 
material and symbolic survival. We cannot restore social recognition if we assume that a 
genuine democracy that can rearrange core socioeconomic relations has even a partial 
existence in today’s world. Criminology’s recognition of harm and its grounding in post-
politics and severed socioeconomic relations can not only move the discipline forward but 
increase its political potency.  
 
 
The pseudo-pacification process: how we made friends with special liberty and harm 
 
In the liberal-capitalist system harm is not an aberration, a set of multiple hazards and 
problematic consequences to be obviated by minor policy tweaks. It is integrated in the 
system’s dynamic core and reproduced in its conventional culture and subjectivity. 
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Throughout its history capitalism has not been a civilizing process but a pseudo-pacification 
process (Hall, 2007; 2012a; 2014). Across the course of the capitalist project in the West 
there has been a marked shift in the normality of harms. After the fall of the Roman Empire 
in Europe the social order was governed in the final instance by intimidation and physical 
violence (Tilly, 1985), which also operated unofficially in a similar vein at the core of a 
criminal shadow-economy dominated by successful brigands (Hibbert, 2003). However, in 
England, after the Norman invasion, proto-capitalists taking advantage of the Norman 
warlords’ lax estate management noticed that a market economy can flourish when property 
rights are protected by reducing both violent governance and violent brigandage. They also 
noticed that the diametric opposite, socioeconomic peace maintained by the cultural norms of 
ethico-legal regulation, altruism and sociability, also hampered the market’s expansion. 
Proto-capitalists emerging amongst the rich peasant and merchant classes attempted 
successfully to arrange a ‘third space’ of ‘orderly disorder’, adjusting politics and law to 
reduce both physical violence and traditional ethics to create a pseudo-pacified social 
environment conducive to the rise of aggressive yet non-violent sociosymbolic competition 
and economic exploitation.  
 
A politico-legal and culturo-economic environment of atomised individualism, exploitative 
business practice and aggressive sociosymbolic competition, in which success was signified 
by gentrification and conspicuous consumption, allowed the more brutal forms of physical 
violence that had permeated crime, governance and punishment to be reduced. Other 
European regions followed suit later in order to expand their own market economies, which, 
despite an earlier start in the Mediterranean region, had been hampered by violent brigandage 
and governance up to the 16th century. The USA found the conversion of physical aggression 
into sublimated sociosymbolic competition a little more difficult to achieve in its condensed 
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period of economic development from the early 19th century. Its homicide rates undulated 
quite markedly and failed to reach the very low rates achieved in Europe. 
 
From the 12th century in England cultural life was highly individualised. The main impetus 
came from legal change as the laws of primogeniture and entail, which applied only to the 
Feudal elite in Europe, were introduced throughout the social structure. All siblings apart 
from the eldest were effectively dispossessed, a traumatic experience which gave them little 
choice but to establish some sort of business operation outside the family and community 
upon which they could attempt to build some security and continuity back into their lives. 
The criminogenic cult of special liberty established itself in the desperate need to overcome 
obstacles. The family and community lost their places as the main economic and protective 
units. Insecure yet ambitious individuals were dispersed into the market economy just as cells 
split as the motor of organic growth. Early capitalism was a sort of socioeconomic tumour, 
virulent and difficult to control (Hall, 2012a). 
 
The growth of markets, and the normalisation of conspicuous consumption as the cultural 
means of anchoring social signification to the economy, coincided with the decline of 
homicide and violent brigandage. However, this decline correlated with a rise in property 
crime, fraud and associated forms of non-violent criminality. Increasing wealth was 
accompanied by declining honour, generosity and egalitarianism. Ethical values were 
displaced from the centre of socioeconomic life and removed to the boundary to act as ascetic 
restraining mechanisms for the containment of the sublimated vices – greed, exploitation, 
deception, usury and sociosymbolic aggression – that had been installed as dynamic forces at 
the core. In this context pacification was neither a product nor a cause of civilised values but 
a functional condition propagated to allow the expansion of aggressive yet non-violent forms 
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of economically functional sociosymbolic competition. Consequential harms became 
collateral damage, unwelcome but necessary. This is the rudimentary shape of the pseudo-
pacification process (see Hall, 2007; 2012a; 2014 for more detail).  
 
This process reduced violent crime and harm but created a probabilistic environment in 
which non-violent crimes and a greater variety of harms were likely to proliferate. Analysis 
of the process requires a conception of modernist subjectivity as dualistic, motivated 
primarily by methodically elicited yet ideologically disavowed aggressive drives, the 
collective of the ‘obscene Real’ and its stupid pleasures (Žižek, 2008), which are pacified by 
internalised cultural codes and external means of control. However, these codes are dualistic 
insofar as they do not simply repress or eliminate but also stimulate and convert aggressive 
drives. This culturo-economic invasion and configuration of the chaotic, undirected drives at 
the core of subjectivity severed the connection between desire and the transcendental ideals 
that can attract and motivate the active social subject. Pacification, sociability and political 
participation thus became overly dependent on the constant gratification of drives and desires 
orientated to sociosymbolic competition.  
 
Contra the Weberian liberal discourse on reflexivity and ethical constitutionalism, the reality 
is that most individuals in the capitalist continuum abandoned ethics and transformative 
rebellion for the sake of adaptation to capitalism’s brutal yet rewarding interpersonal 
competition. Ethical realism and its politics were rejected in favour of pure pragmatism and 
the multiple gestures of ethical idealism manifested in fake ‘sentimentalism’ and 
‘benevolentism’ (Eagleton, 2009). In such a cynical epoch, the internalised consumerist envy 
– publically disavowed to be experienced privately as enjoyment – that energises the 
capitalist project, and the special liberty and exploitation it continues to sanction, is 
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celebrated by the liberal right and criticised only sporadically and lightly by the liberal left, 
least of all by ‘radical’ criminologists who cling desperately to outdated notions such as the 
‘moral economy’. Deep critique of consumer culture and subjectivity seemed to be the 
preserve of an unholy alliance of now extinct conservatives and socialists. The likelihood that 
much economic and expressive criminality is the outcome of the twin desires to constantly 
gratify obscene drives that cannot be gratified, and simultaneously avoid the mundane labour 
and social obligations that once structured the lives of everyday people, is currently escaping 
us. Contributing by default of silence to the ideology that disavows these obscene drives, left-
liberal criminological theorists cannot connect agency to structure or explain the motivations 
behind most forms of crime. On the other hand, by positing the ‘malady of infinite 
aspirations’ as timeless and natural, conservative control theorists along with traditional 
Durkheimians and Mertonians reproduce the fallacy that both protects the economic system 
and its subjects’ exploitative activities and justifies the expansion of the control apparatus. 
 
Elias’s (1994) theory of the ‘civilizing process’ joins the criminological canon in ignoring the 
systematic promotion of sublimated rule-bound aggression in business and sociosymbolic 
life. There has never been a ‘civilizing process’. Neither has there ever been a Foucauldian 
disciplinary regime of ‘biopower’ normalising the population and producing discursive 
subjectivity, rather, a system of regulatory practices sanctioned and reproduced by the 
population itself to control the socially and environmentally harmful overflow from the 
sublimely aggressive subjectivity they also sanction and reproduce. Sublimated aggression is 
cultural fuel required for the economic development and prosperity that the majority wanted 
and for which they continue to sacrifice their subjective freedom and tolerate an inherently 
criminogenic environment. This is the still the situation today; the normalised and fully 
sanctioned presence of sublimated aggression at the centre of cultural and socioeconomic life, 
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practiced every day by sublimely competitive individuals throughout the social structure and 
across the political divide, makes ideology’s reproductive job rather easy.  
 
 
 
Transcendental materialism 
 
Perhaps, then, it’s time for criminology and social science in general to consider the 
importation of a new philosophical perspective that rests on a combination of revived and 
innovative concepts. The upshot of this position is that capitalism has temporarily captured 
the majority of Western individuals at the deep psychological level of drive and desire as 
subjects of its ideology. All idealist theories based primarily on false consciousness, 
hegemony, language, symbolic interaction, discourse, interpretivism and ethical 
constitutionalism thus fail. The theory of pseudo-pacification can draw upon transcendental 
materialism to provide ontological foundations for its criminological argument that the 
fundamental purpose of this capture is to simultaneously stimulate and pacify the subject’s 
drives is such a way that they obviate any form of collectivism and fuel consumer culture and 
economic expansion. This requires a reassessment of the mediatory relationship between 
biology, culture and ideology. The simplified upshot is that human drives are not hard-wired 
‘instincts’ mechanistically attuned to survival and triggered by environmental phenomena, 
but, as the latest neuroscience suggests, activated by an assortment of sophisticated emotions 
(see Damasio, 2003) that constitute an interface between weak, indeterminate instincts and 
the external realm of symbols and ideology (Johnston, 2008; Malabou and Johnston, 2013).  
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The trace of the experience of extreme abuse and neglect in early childhood can be etched 
firmly in the neurological system, which partially explains the motivations behind most of the 
relatively small amount of extreme and methodical violent crime (Bollas, 1995), but most 
crime is committed by those who have not experienced such extreme terror. Some family 
regimes are excessively brutal, but the majority are merely tough, and some can combine 
tough discipline with care. Most forms of family socialisation are preparation for the 
individual’s future life in capitalism’s competitive individualist culture. Mainstream culture 
and its institutions work on behalf of the pseudo-pacification process to socialise tough 
individual competitors willing to play by the rules. Here we can see the rough initial shape of 
a conception of subjectivity and harm that is both scalar and formal: capitalism seeks ideal-
type subjects willing to do harm to others as they pursue the commodifiable types of self-
interest that fuel economic expansion, but the ideal-type harm is also scaled down to stop 
short of direct physical violence.  
 
To justify the perpetration of activities that are harmful or potentially harmful to others – 
harms that range across a complex spectrum from loss of livelihood and diminution of status 
to physical intimidation and violence – the individual must enter a scalar mode of 
dissociation (Stein, 2007; Sullivan, 1953), a subjectivity that seeks to by-pass social 
language, morality and social obligations to simply act in accordance with drives and desires 
orientated to success in the sociosymbolic competition (see also Stiegler, 2009). Dissociation 
allows the individual subject to imagine a personalised state of exception, granting himself 
special liberty to attempt – compulsively yet always unsuccessfully – to gratify drives and the 
desires that connect them to external objects, which can range from the norm of pseudo-
pacified sociosymbolic ambition to the extreme of irrational hatred and prejudice. The 
ruthless businessman, the neighbourhood bully and the serial killer all operate with scalar 
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rather than qualitative variations of special liberty. Freedom, of course, has nothing to do 
with special liberty, but exists beyond an initial escape from its underlying drives and desires. 
 
Therefore what separates the ruthless businessman from the serial killer is little more than a 
scalar variation in drives, desires and willingness to conform to the system’s rules. The 
subject of special liberty, driven by consumer capitalism’s obscene Real of envious and 
competitive drives, can operate throughout the social structure, from ghettoes to corporate 
boardrooms and governmental corridors of power. Liberal capitalism has never attempted to 
either ‘liberate’ or ‘control’ subjects, but to create and reproduce a third space created by the 
dynamic tension between both. Many would agree that the fostering of genuinely civilized 
emotions would lead to a more sociable and peaceful world, but the conundrum is that they 
would be economically and personally dysfunctional in capitalism’s competitive 
sociosymbolic environment.  
 
A criminological take on transcendental materialism begins with the connection between 
harm and loosely controlled drives and desires, but, unlike conservative control theory, it 
does not naturalise or transhistoricise them. Left liberalism, on the other hand lacks a positive 
conception of harm as drive. Overwhelmed by a constant fear of natural forces that threaten 
to overwhelm the autonomous ethical individual and the systems of symbolic negotiation on 
which its philosophy depends, liberalism can only posit the cause of harm as an aberration, a 
misunderstanding or a failure to negotiate meaning between the actor and the victim. 
Transcendental materialism presents us with a way forward by understanding the human 
neurological system as an abyss of weak, undirected instincts shot through with conflicting 
drives. The upshot is that the human being is hard-wired but only, paradoxically, for 
plasticity, and therefore malleable, in any substantive sense of the term, only at the material 
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level (Johnston, 2008). In our evolutionary, migratory history this malleability has been 
essential for survival in multiple physical environments that have changed in a variety of 
ways over time and have, until the widespread use of technology, demanded different forms 
of socioeconomic organisation (ibid., see also Gilmore, 1990). Symbolic systems, on the 
other hand, do not offer flexibility and transformative momentum but have evolved for the 
practical purpose of providing chaotic drives with the rigid communicative comprehensibility 
that social groups require to function as economic organisations.  
 
Because pre-symbolic life is traumatic for the helpless child, de-naturalising the proto-self to 
create subjects of language and seek a comprehensible symbolic order inhabited by others 
who are committed to shared meanings is also a natural act. This process, whether Butler and 
the post-structuralists like it or not, is the formation of what we call subjectivity. Individuals 
must actively ‘solicit the trap’ of a rigid symbolic order – an ideology – simply to become 
selves and belong to a group as social subjects (Hall, 2012c). However, the major and 
hitherto intractable problem is deaptation. Symbolic systems, which have usually been 
hierarchical as environmentally specific functional successes were translated into social 
orders, periodically become counter-productive in new environments. Ideologies tend to 
insulate themselves from major shifts in natural and socioeconomic environments because 
powerful conformist subjects who have benefitted from the ideologies’ establishment expend 
huge effort and use their disproportionate influence to ensure their reproduction and resist 
change. However, on its own and with no reconstructive purpose in sight, constant dissent is 
counter-productive because anxious individuals cannot tolerate an existence in the absence of 
an ideology whose values, norms and symbols are shared by others; they crave a unary order. 
Identity that has been actively solicited by anxious individuals fleeing the primary trauma can 
be provided only by entrance into a symbolic order, whose values, norms and symbols are 
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returned inwards to be consolidated and temporarily re-naturalised in the body’s neurological 
circuits.  
 
Ideology does not need to constantly naturalise itself by hegemonic means; the subject seeks 
this re-naturalisation as an escape from trauma. Today’s ideology is primarily negative; 
people have all sorts of positive opinions about this and that, which suggests that a dominant 
ideology does not exist (see Abercrombie et al., 1980), but the dominant ideology the vast 
majority share is ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009), the conviction, honed in the era of 
political catastrophism, that no alternative socioeconomic system is possible. Capitalist 
realism’s ideological function is to vigilantly repudiate the reality that, to truly transform 
itself at the level of drives and desire, the subject must risk another traumatic encounter with 
the Real of indeterminate drives, but refuse to stay in this dismal, fearful, permanently 
fragmented position of liberal-postmodernist, post-structural limbo where no alternative 
unary identity can be constructed and no real politics can take place. Rather, to regain sanity 
and increase the chance of potential collective survival into the future, the subject must re-
enter an alternative ideology suited to the current environment. The ontological claim is that 
there exists neither an ‘autonomous’ nor a ‘determined’ subject, but a proto-subject who 
actively seeks a collective symbolic order in which he or she can become individuated; the 
choice between obsolete or new symbolic orders is the sole choice available. 
 
Modernity’s alternative unary political and socioeconomic orders – socialism and social 
democracy – have disintegrated with no replacement in sight. Liberalism, on the other hand, 
does not exist as a unary political order, only as a clearing house for atomised individuals and 
plural cultures in a market economy and a political safety valve for the forces of structural 
change (see Hedges, 2010). Violent criminality and both traditional and new forms of 
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competitive, hostile tribalism grow in the vacuum created by the abandonment of the project 
to construct a new unary order. Examples abound in today’s violent paraspaces and failed 
states, in disrupted former agricultural communities and communist states, in deindustrialised 
and economically abandoned areas of the old industrial world, and in the cut and thrust of 
global geopolitics and business competition (Hall, 2012c). Only expansive securitisation and 
the rule of law, combined with the empty promise of increasing prosperity somewhere down 
the line when traditional capitalist economic principles can be revived, prevent further unrest 
and violence. 
 
Left-liberalism and neoliberalism, together with their classical liberal antecedents, are two 
variations of a liberal-capitalist system that is a historical exception insofar as it has never 
attempted to create solidarity and security, unlike preceding and intervening systems, which 
were failed attempts to do so (Jameson, 2010). To promote aggressive competition between 
energetic asocial individuals it systematically stimulates the anxiety of a subject stranded in 
the limbo between trauma and the dream of a secure unary order that can never be realised. 
Pseudo-pacification was not a process seeking to adapt to a new environment. Rather, 
recognising the energising value of permanent dissociation and anxiety, it sought to expand 
and reproduce a novel and synthetic simulacrum, a post-social environment (Winlow and 
Hall, 2013). The pseudo-pacification process is founded on the stimulation, democratisation 
and subsequent recapture in its active symbolic form of the obscene Real, whose drives are 
sublimated to fuel sociosymbolic competition and energise the economy. Therefore from its 
inception the system was fundamentally and functionally deaptive, a form of managed 
deaptation fuelled by the seductive dream of constantly going beyond all ethical and natural 
limits, a Rabelaisian injunction to do as thy wilt and damn the consequences. For enthusiastic 
and reluctant recruits alike, pacification is dependent on continuous incremental increases in 
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wealth and the ability to circulate the commodities and competitive opportunities for social 
status and the recapture of lost identity. The very core of the system is criminogenic, but, 
paradoxically, so far anyway, it has pacified populations insofar as traditional forms of 
acquisitive, expressive and governmental physical violence have been largely displaced by a 
far more expansive accumulation of variegated and hidden harms. 
 
The present is characterised by automated production, resource depletion, climate change, 
slow economic growth and consumer saturation. The pseudo-pacification process is 
becoming truly outdated and dysfunctional. Our ability to keep the lid on crime and harm is 
currently over-reliant on an unsustainable combination; the constant expansion of both the 
external control system and the means of gratifying consumer desires. There are signs that 
some young people mighty be seeking an alternative unary ideology beyond left-liberalism’s 
theatre of aimless dissent, a truly adaptive socioeconomic order that transcends the pseudo-
pacification process. Others, less attuned to the hazards and possibilities of our current 
situation, retreat into depressive hedonia, an asocial, post-political realm of restlessness, 
nihilism and frustration, seeking temporary respite in the ‘soft narcosis’ of late-night TV, 
marijuana and the new round of cheap or free commodities (see Fisher, 2009). In the most 
impoverished locales, many continue to drift into criminality. Perhaps criminology – if it 
allowed itself to take advantage of its clear view of the system’s most deleterious and often 
tragic consequences – can investigate the pressing need for a new unary order in which it is 
possible to relax the pressure, to stop stoking anxiety and the sense of lack in the individual’s 
psyche. Perhaps this would move us towards less disappointment and frustration, less crime, 
a return to the principles of citizenship and democratic politics and a diminished need for 
control.  
 
25 
 
References 
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. (1980) The Dominant Ideology Thesis. London: 
Allen & Unwin 
 
Agamben, G. (2005). The State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, trans. K. 
Attell 
Akram, S. (2014) ‘Recognizing the 2011 United Kingdom Riots as Political Protest 
A Theoretical Framework Based on Agency, Habitus and the Preconscious’, British Journal 
of Criminology, 54(3): 375-392 
 
Becker, E. (1975) Escape from Evil. New York: The Free Press 
 
Bollas, C. (1995) Cracking Up. London: Routledge  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity 
 
Braidotti, R. (2002) Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Burdis, K. and Tombs, S. (2012) ‘After the Crisis: New Directions in Theorising Corporate 
and White-Collar Crime’, in S. Hall and S. Winlow (eds.) New Directions in Criminological 
Theory. London: Routledge 
 
Butler, J. (1993), in Osborne, P. and Segal, L. ‘Gender as performance: An interview with 
Judith Butler’, Radical Philosophy, 67: 32-39 
 
Crogan, P. (2010) ‘Knowledge, Care and Transindividuation: An Interview with Bernard 
Stiegler’, Cultural Politics, 6(2): 157–70 
 
Currie, E. (2010) ‘Plain Left Realism: An Appreciation and Some Thoughts for the Future’, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, 54: 111–24 
 
Damasio, A. (2003) Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Orlando, FL: 
Harcourt 
 
Dean, J. (2009) Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and 
Left Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 
 
Dews, P. (1995) ‘The Tremor of Reflection: Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian Dialectics’, in Dews, P. 
(ed.) The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy. London: 
Verso 
 
Dews, P. (2008) The Idea of Evil. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Eagleton, T. (2009) Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 
 
Ebert, T. (1999) ‘Globalization, internationalism, and the class politics of cynical reason’, 
Nature, Society, and Thought, 12(4): 389-410 
 
26 
 
Elias, N. (1994) The Civilizing Process. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Ericson, R. (2006) Crime in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity 
 
Fisher, M. (2009) Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Alresford: Zero Books 
 
Gilmore, D. (1990) Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press 
 
Hall, S. (2007) ‘The Emergence and Breakdown of the Pseudo-Pacification Process’, in 
Watson. K. (ed.) Assaulting the Past: Violence and Civilization in Historical Context. 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press 
Hall, S., Winlow, S. and Ancrum, C. (2008) Criminal Identities and Consumer Culture: 
Crime, Exclusion and the new Culture of Narcissism. London: Routledge/Willan 
 
Hall, S. (2012a) Theorizing Crime and Deviance: A New Perspective. London: Sage 
Hall, S. (2012b) ‘The Solicitation of the Trap: On transcendence and transcendental 
materialism in advanced consumer-capitalism’, Human Studies: Special Issue on 
Transcendence and Transgression, 35(3): 365-381  
Hall, S. (2012c) ‘Don’t Look Up, Don’t Look Down: Liberal criminology’s fear of the 
supreme and the subterranean’, Crime, Media, Culture: Special Issue: York Deviancy 
Conference 2011, 8(2): 197-212 
Hall, S. (2014) ‘The Socioeconomic Function of Evil’, in Ray. L. and Kilby, J. (eds.) 
Sociological Review Monograph: Violence and Society: Towards a New Sociology. 
Chichester: Wiley 
Harvey, D. (2007) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hedges, C. (2010) The Death of the Liberal Class. New York: Nation 
 
Henry, S. and Milovanovic, D. (1996) Constitutive Criminology: Beyond postmodernism. 
London: Sage 
 
Hibbert, C. (2003) The Roots of Evil. Stroud: Sutton 
 
Holloway, J. (2002) Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution 
Today. London: Pluto 
 
Honneth, A. (1996) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Jacoby, R. (2005) Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-utopian Age. New York: 
Columbia University Press 
 
Jameson, F. (1981) The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. 
London: Methuen 
27 
 
 
Jameson, F. (2010) Valences of the Dialectic. London: Verso 
 
Johnston, A. (2008) Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 
 
Loader, I. and Sparks, R. (2010) Public Criminology?: Criminological Politics in the Twenty-
first Century. London: Routledge 
 
Malabou, C. and Johnston, A. (2013) Self and Emotional Life. New York: Columbia 
University Press 
 
Matthews, R. (2014) Realist Criminology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Mirowski, P. (2013) Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived 
the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso 
 
Mouffe, C. (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso 
 
Parker, K. F. (2008) Unequal Crime Decline: Theorizing Race, Urban Inequality and 
Criminal Violence. New York: New York University Press 
 
Parker, I. (2004) Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction. London: Pluto 
 
Passavant, P. (2005) ‘The Strong Neoliberal State: Crime, Consumption, Governance’, 
Theory and Event, 8(3): http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/jour-
nals/theory_and_event/v008/8.3passavant.html. Accessed 03/02/2014 
 
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press 
 
Pinker, S. (2012) The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity. 
London: Penguin 
 
Reiner, R. (2007) Law and Order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to Crime and Control. 
Cambridge: Polity 
 
Schmitt, C. (1985[1922]) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans. G. Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Stiegler, B. (2009) Acting Out. Stanford University Press, trans. D. Barison, D. Ross and P. 
Crogan 
 
Stiegler, B. (2011) For a New Critique of Political Economy. Cambridge: Polity 
 
Stein, A. (2007) Prologue to Violence: Child Abuse, Dissociation and Crime. Mahwah, NJ: 
The Analytic Press 
 
Sullivan, H. (1953) Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. New York: W.W. Norton 
 
28 
 
Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J. (1973) The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of 
Deviance. London: Routledge 
 
Tilly, C. (1985) ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Evans, P., 
Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds.) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Treadwell, J., Briggs, D., Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2013) ‘Shopocalypse Now: Consumer 
culture and the English riots of 2011’, British Journal of Criminology, 53(1): 1-17  
Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2012) ‘A Predictably Obedient Riot: Post-politics, consumer culture 
and the English riots of 2011’, Cultural Politics 8(3): 465-488 
Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2013) Rethinking Social Exclusion: The End of the Social? London: 
Sage 
 
Yar, M. (2012) ‘Critical Criminology, Critical Theory and Social Harm’, in Hall, S. and 
Winlow, S. (eds.) New Directions in Criminological Theory. London: Willan/Routledge 
 
Young, J. (1987) ‘The Tasks Facing a Realist Criminology’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 
11(4): 337–56 
 
Žižek, S. (2001) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? London: Verso 
 
Žižek, S. (2008) Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. London: Profile 
 
